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  This article analyses the complementarity between various dimensions of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and financial performance. We 
hypothesise that the absence of consensus in the empirical literature on the 
CSR-financial performance relationship may be explained by the existence of 
synergies (complementarity) and trade-offs (substitutability) between the 
different CSR components. We investigate such relationships using a sample 
of 595 firms from 15 European countries over the 2002-2007 period. The 
results suggest some kind of trade-offs between CSR components. Some CSR 
combinations appear as relative complements, human resources and business 
behaviour towards customers and suppliers, suggesting mutual benefits and 
less conflicts between those stakeholders. Conversely, environment and 
business behaviour towards customers and suppliers appear as relative 
substitutes, suggesting more conflict or over-investment between such types 
of stakeholders. 
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 1  Introduction 
 
Considerable attention in the literature has been given to the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and financial performance over the past three decades, 
especially in the fields of management sciences and economics of organizations. However, no 
consensus has emerged so far on whether or not CSR leads to superior financial performance 
(for a survey see e.g. Margolis and Walsh, 2003 or Margolis et al., 2007). Hence many scholars 
still consider that much research needs to be conducted before this relationship can be fully 
understood (see e.g. Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Rowley and Berman, 2000; Surroca et al., 2010; 
Delmas et al., 2011). 
 Three main methodologies have been used in the literature to examine the link 
between environmental and social responsibility and financial performance. First, event studies 
examine the effect of new information on stock returns, considering that any information on 
environmental or social management should be reflected in how market analysts assess the 
financial impact of a firm’s environmental or social management performance. Capital markets 
seem to react negatively to adverse news like environmental incidents and positively to good 
news such as  the announcement that a firm is using cleaner technologies (see e.g. Dasgupta et 
al., 2001). Second, Best-in-class versus Worst-in-class studies compare the portfolio 
performance of firms considered the most responsible with irresponsible companies, or on the 
basis of negative screening of irresponsible firms. However, results appear relatively mixed in 
this literature (see e.g. Derwall et al., 2005 or Barnett and Salomon, 2006). The third category, 
econometric estimations, relies on environmental and social ratings (like KLD in the US or Vigeo 
in Europe) or on quantitative data (like that on emissions, corruption, rewards policy etc.) to 
measure environmental and social performance and test their impact on financial performance 
(see e.g. Elsayed and Paton, 2005; Scholtens, 2008; Horvathova, 2010; Iwata and Okada, 2011). 
This literature does not seem to reach a clear-cut conclusion on the relationship between CSR 
and firm performance. Several arguments have been developed to explain the contradictory 
results underlying this absence of consensus. Recent research points to numerous biases and 
problems in previous work (see e.g. McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Elsayed and Paton, 2005) 
including the following: model misspecification (endogeneity), omitted variables in the 
determinants of profitability, limited data (small samples, old periods), cross-sectional analysis 
invalid in the presence of significant firm heterogeneity, problems of measurement of CSR, and 
the wide diversity of measures used to assess financial performance. Another problem lies in 
the direction and mechanisms of causation. Whether CSR leads to superior financial 
performance, or whether financial performance is rather a necessary condition for CSR is a 
major issue tackled by few papers (notable exceptions are Waddock and Graves, 1997; Margolis 
et al., 2007; Scholtens, 2008; Lioui and Sharma, 2012). 
 In this paper, we consider that the absence of consensus on the links between CSR and 
financial performance rather hides a double phenomenon: high performance in firms which 
simultaneously adopt some CSR practices that are relative complements, and low performance 
in firms which simultaneously adopt CSR practices that are relative substitutes (in this case, 
financial performance would be high when firms invest in one single practice but not all of 
them). Thus it should be a specific combination of CSR practices that would likely lead to 
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superior financial performance. In fact, being socially responsible means that, beyond legal 
constraints, firms commit on a voluntary basis to bear the cost of more ethical behaviour in a 
variety of practices: for example improving employment conditions and/or banning child labour 
in countries that do not respect human rights, protecting the environment and investing in 
abatement equipment to reduce the carbon footprint, developing partnerships with NGOs, or 
providing funds to charity, etc. (European Commission, 2001). Therefore, CSR is inherently 
multi-faceted and implies a multi-dimensional decision. Researchers often group those different 
dimensions into three main pillars: environmental, social and corporate governance (so-called 
ESG factors). Hence, as pointed out by Benabou and Tirole, (2010) the different dimensions of 
CSR need to be considered, since firms can do well in some dimensions and poorly in others. But 
why would firms decide to implement some CSR practices rather than others? Are there specific 
synergies and trade-offs among the different CSR practices so that to be effective companies 
should accompany the implementation of one CSR practice with other appropriate CSR 
practices? In other words, are the multiple dimensions of CSR practices complementary (leading 
to synergistic effects on financial performance when adopted together) or substitutable (leading 
to improved financial performance in isolation, only when they are not adopted 
simultaneously)? 
 The main proposition of this paper is to investigate the interactions between the 
multiple dimensions of CSR that mediate the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance, and analyse how this mediation operates through synergies (complementarity) 
and trade-offs (substitutability) between each pair of CSR practices. We use an international 
matched CSR-Firm performance database provided by the European extra-financial agency 
Vigeo over the 2002-2007 period. Our sample of 595 firms from 15 European countries is a 
useful complement to existing studies, which often focus on US companies based for instance 
on KLD data. We use two types of CSR measures available in our dataset: scores and ratings 
attributed over three broad CSR domains, human resources, environment and business 
behaviour (towards customers and suppliers). 
 On the methodological side, we rely on an original two-step approach to test how 
complementarity or substitutability between the different CSR practices affects the relationship 
between CSR and financial performance. In a first step, we exploit the dynamic dimension of our 
dataset through the system GMM (Generalised Method of Moments) technique and estimate 
the impact of CSR scores on financial performance. In a second step we test explicitly the 
complementarity between the environmental, human resources and business behaviour 
dimensions using industry-adjusted ratings. We do find some combinations are  
complementarity inputs of financial performance: human resources and business behaviour; 
while others are substitutable inputs of financial performance: environment and business 
behaviour in the supply chain. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we derive a theoretical 
rationale to support our hypotheses on synergy (complementarity) and trade-off 
(substitutability) between CSR practices. We present our data and variables in Section 3, and the 
empirical strategy in Section 4. Section 5 derives the results and section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
4 
 
 2  Synergies between CSR practices and financial performance: 
theoretical rationale 
 
As CSR is a multi-dimensional construct, the different dimensions need to be taken into 
account when analysing its impact on financial performance (Carroll, 1979; Hillman and Keim, 
2001; Benabou and Tirole, 2010). The resource-based view of the firm considers that a firm 
might perform better than its competitors depending on a unique interplay of human, physical, 
and organisational resources over time, and that some complementary resources are most likely 
to lead to competitive advantage, in particular those that are valuable, rare and inimitable 
(Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Barney, 1991). Similarly, during the 1990s, the complementarity 
between different managerial practices proved a useful explanation of the Solow paradox, 
whereby “you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics" (Solow, 
1987). Indeed, studies have shown that only those firms that adopted both computerization and 
complementary innovative human resources management practices (teamwork, multi-tasking, 
quality circles, etc.) enjoyed superior performance (see Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003). By analogy, 
we hypothesise here that the apparently ambiguous link between CSR and financial 
performance could presumably be explained by taking into account the complementarity 
between the different dimensions of CSR (environmental, social and corporate governance). In 
other words, the absence of a clear-cut impact of various CSR practices on financial 
performance would hide the fact that two types of CSR ’models’ can be valued on the market 
(i.e. can lead to higher financial performance). 
 The first model exploits synergies among different CSR practices and corresponds to 
companies investing in complementary CSR practices. Complementarity between two practices 
means that investing in one responsible practice (for example towards customers and suppliers) 
increases the value of investing in another responsible practice (for example towards 
employees). In this case, as stated in the conflict-resolution hypothesis, firms tend to use CSR 
activities to reduce conflicts of interest between managers and the firm’s stakeholders (Harjoto 
and Jo, 2011). From a theoretical perspective, the complementarity (or conflict-resolution) 
hypothesis may be explained using the stakeholder management theory (Freeman, 1984; 
Clarskon, 1995) according to which building better relations with primary stakeholders like 
employees, customers, suppliers, and communities could lead to increased financial returns by 
helping firms develop intangible but valuable assets which can be source of competitive 
advantage (Hillman and Keim, 2001). If the conflict-resolution motive is correct, firms will use 
complementary CSR practices to reduce conflict between various stakeholders. Lessened 
conflict, reduced agency problems among those stakeholders, will result in higher financial 
performance (Harjoto and Jo, 2011). For instance, the Ford Motor Company has developed an 
innovative project - the Supply Chain Sustainability group - in order to promote its CSR priorities 
in the supply chain (the business behaviour component), along with a Code of Basic Working 
Conditions covering workplace issues such as compensation, freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, harassment and discrimination, health and safety, and work hours (the 
social component).
4
 Thus we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
                                                      
4  For further details see the case study by Dold (2009). 
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  Hypothesis 1: Complementary CSR practices are positively associated with financial 
performance when they are combined and therefore simultaneously implemented (conflict-
resolution motive).  
 
 The second model exploits substituabilities and corresponds to companies which 
deliberately invest in one responsible practice (for example towards the environment) to the 
detriment of other responsible practices (for example towards customers and suppliers) 
because investing in both of them is too costly, or because investing in one of them decreases 
the relative value of investing in the other one. In this case, substitutability will lead to over-
investment related to costs when firms decide to invest simultaneously in several substitutable 
CSR practices. From a theoretical perspective, the substitutability (or over-investment) 
hypothesis may be explained using the principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
whereby top management would tend to over-invest in CSR activities to build their own 
personal reputation as good global citizens (Barnea and Rubin, 2006). If the over-investment 
hypothesis is correct, then we expect that firms are less likely to engage in multiple CSR 
practices since higher performance is associated with less over-investment, less agency 
problems (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003). 
For instance, the high performing Wal-mart group is developing an ambitious plan to 
boost energy efficiency, cut down on waste and reduce greenhouse gases tied to global 
warming (environmental component), but remains highly criticiced by NGOs notably for its 
business practices and extensive foreign product sourcing, treatment of employees and product 
suppliers.
5
 Thus we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
  Hypothesis 2: Substitutable CSR practices are positively associated with financial 
performance when implemented in isolation (that is when they are not combined and not 
implemented simultaneously), and negatively associated with financial performance when they 
are adopted simultaneously (over-investment motive).  
 
 What type of CSR practices may be complementary or substitutable inputs of financial 
performance? This question can be answered by relying on the New Stakeholder View (Post, 
Preston and Sachs, 2002) which posits that the capacity of a firm to generate long term financial 
performance is determined by its relationship with critical stakeholders. Some stakeholders 
have common interests while others have potential conflicts and the various stakeholders of the 
firms are positioned in relation to three strategic dimensions: resource-base, industry-market, 
and social-political arena. The resource-base stakeholders are suppliers of capital, labour, and 
customers/users; the industry-market stakeholders are supply chain associates, joint venture 
partners and alliances, regulatory authorities and unions; and the social-political arena 
stakeholders are composed of governments, communities, and NGOs. While the first two 
categories refer to direct ’business’ or ’voluntary’ stakeholders (critical business stakeholders 
such as investors, employees and customers, and peripheral business stakeholders such as 
supply chain associates, unions, regulatory authorities), the third category refers to ’non 
                                                      
5  For further details on Wal-Mart’s business policies see the case study by Lussier (2008). Management 
Fundamentals: Concepts, Applications, Skill Development. South-Western College Pub, p.77-78. 
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business’ or ’involuntary’ stakeholders (concerning community relations and environmental 
issues, that is stakeholders who are rather adversely affected by externalities such as pollution 
or congestion). In the new stakeholder theory the basic principle with respect to voluntary 
business stakeholders is mutual benefit, and with respect to involuntary non-business 
stakeholders the basic principle is avoidance of harm. Applying such an argument to the 
management of multi-dimensional CSR would mean that some CSR practices may have a 
synergistic impact on financial performance (those based on mutual benefit between voluntary 
stakeholders, for instance between employees and supply chain associates), while others may 
lead to conflicts among stakeholders (between voluntary and involuntary stakeholders, for 
instance between supply chain associates and environmental management) thereby leading to 
reduced impact on financial performance. In our framework, this implies that there should be 
some synergies (i.e. complementarity) between CSR practices that positively affect voluntary 
business stakeholders and some trade-offs (i.e. conflict or substitutability) between CSR 
practices that positively affect business and non-business stakeholders. Thus we propose the 
following hypothesis. 
 
  Hypothesis 3: CSR practices are complementary inputs of financial performance when 
they positively affect only voluntary business stakeholders (due to mutual benefit), and they are 
substitutable inputs of financial performance when they positively affect voluntary business and 
involuntary non-business stakeholders (due to conflict among stakeholders).  
 
 
 
 3  Data and variables 
 
 Our analysis is based on a panel of CSR and financial performance data for the 300 
biggest European listed (publicly-traded) firms over the 2002-2007 period. CSR is measured 
thanks to the database of Vigeo, the leading European CSR rating agency. Financial performance 
variables come from the Orbis dataset (Bureau Van Dijk), a comprehensive database from the 
companies’ standardised annual accounts, consolidated and unconsolidated, together with their 
financial profiles. In order to avoid the sample selection issue, we do not require a balanced 
panel. Thus, the number of firms in our sample differs year to year and the estimation strategy 
uses as many observations as available. Moreover, in order to exploit the dynamic dimension of 
our database (i.e. to introduce the lagged value of the dependent variable), we have to observe 
firms over at least two consecutive years. We thus exclude firms that do not provide complete 
information. Our final unbalanced panel sample comprises 1094 observations (around 300 firms 
per year) in 15 countries over the period 2002-2007. 
 
 3.1  Firms’ characteristics and financial performance 
 
 Variables measuring firms’ characteristics and financial performance are extracted from 
the Orbis database, which contains information combined from nearly 100 sources 
(Datamonitor, Zephyr, Coface etc.) filtered into various standard report formats. The dataset 
has up to 25 data sections and 10 years of history, including detailed information from the 
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companies’ standardised
6
 annual accounts, consolidated and unconsolidated, together with 
financial profile (balance sheet, P&L account, financial ratio), activities and ownership (cash 
flow, total assets, intangible assets valuation etc.), profitability ratio (profit margin, solvency 
ratio etc.) and operational and structure ratios. 
 We use two types of variable from the Orbis dataset. The first type of variable 
represents the firms’ characteristics in terms of operational and financial structure. To explain 
financial performance, the usual control variables are considered (see e.g. Waddock and Graves, 
1997; Baron et al., 2008; Scholtens, 2008; Surroca et al., 2010): firm size (sales); total assets; and 
debt ratio. To control for the sensitivity to stock market variations, we introduce a dummy 
variable identifying firms listed on the Dow Jones STOXX600 index. Moreover, to control for 
differences between countries and industries, we include country and industry dummies 
according to the two-digit sectoral classification (NES16) provided by INSEE (the French National 
Statistical Office), which is widely used for the national accounts. To control for macroeconomic 
variations and business cycle fluctuations, we introduce yearly dummies (year fixed effects). 
 Finally, we also introduce two important variables: a Research and Development (R&D) 
intensity and an advertising ratio. Indeed, omitting these variables would likely give misleading 
results. Regarding R&D expenses, the process of product differentiation may in fact include 
investment in R&D projects to add social and environmental attributes to the product, and that 
are acknowledged by customers (Elsayed and Paton, 2005). Similarly, Lioui and Sharma (2012) 
show that the interaction between CSR and R&D efforts has a positive impact on financial 
performance. Moreover, advertising may help to raise consumer and investor awareness of 
environmental and social-friendly products. The R&D intensity indicator is measured by R&D 
expenses divided by total sales. In order to keep a maximum of firms in the sample and because 
of missing data on R&D expenses, we use a standard statistical technique which consists of 
controlling for the absence of reported R&D expenditures in the annual accounts by including in 
the estimations a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if R&D expenses are not reported by 
firms and 0 otherwise. Following Elsayed and Paton (2005), we also include the ratio of total 
intangible assets to total sales in order to capture a proxy for advertising. 
 The second set of variables from the Orbis database characterises financial 
performance. We consider two variables to assess the diversity of financial performance 
measures. Traditionally, financial performance is measured by accounting or by market-based 
indicators. Both types of measures represent different perspectives on the value of financial 
performance. Accounting measures, such as return on assets, return on equity or return on 
sales, capture the historical aspects of financial performance and are therefore backward-
looking (McGuire et al., 1986). The accounting measure we use is the return on assets (ROA). 
We also rely on a market performance measure, the Tobin’s Q, which is a measure of return 
based on the stock market (market value of a company’s stock compared to the value of a 
company’s equity book value). The Tobin’s Q represents the investors’ evaluation of the ability 
of a firm to generate future economic earnings and is therefore forward-looking. Hence the 
Tobin’s Q can be considered as a proxy for growth opportunities. This financial performance 
indicator thus seems more appropriate to capture the expected future impact of CSR on 
financial performance (Hillman and Keim, 2001). The Tobin’s Q also is expected to better 
                                                      
6  Orbis information is standardised given the differences in accounting practices across countries.  
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capture the value of long-term investments (see Dowell et al., 2000; Surroca et al., 2010). Note 
however that the Tobin’s Q may be sensitive to variations that are independent of the 
operations and social activities of firms, like macroeconomic shocks and political issues, or to 
industry-specific factors such as rising or falling prices due to shifts in industry demand or 
restrictions on supply, as in the case of oil or other raw materials. Introducing year and industry 
dummies allows the capture of such factors. 
 
 3.2  Corporate social responsibility variables 
 
To measure CSR, we rely on the Vigeo database. Vigeo is the leading European extra-
financial rating agency and evaluates the CSR performance and risk factors on Environmental, 
Social and Governance (ESG) criteria of European firms listed on the DJSTOXX 600 and MSCI 
World indexes (595 European firms). It supplies this information to investors and asset 
managers notably. Vigeo (formerly known as ARESE) can be considered as the European 
counterpart of KLD, with comparable methods. Igalens and Gond (2005) in fact compare KLD 
and Vigeo data and quote few differences explained mainly by different cultural sensitivities. 
 
 Vigeo’s Methodology 
 
 Vigeo measures CSR on a positive screening basis (identifying companies that are the 
best performers on various indicators) on six broad domains or dimensions: human rights,  
environment, human resources, business behaviour towards customers and suppliers, 
corporate governance, and community involvement. For each dimension, there is a subset of 
criteria describing how the firm manages the particular aspect of CSR. However, not all of the six 
domains are investigated by Vigeo for the whole sample because before companies are rated, 
an analysis is done to identify the key CSR issues within the business sector. This determines 
which criteria in each of the six domains will be activated in each sector. Vigeo’s analysis then 
focuses on how each company addresses each criterion in terms of Leadership, Implementation, 
and Results. The evaluation is realised by Vigeo via a questionnaire, and not by the firms 
themselves. The ratings model is based on internationally recognised CSR standards. For each 
criterion, the questionnaire is based on three items and nine approaches. For all criteria a 
weight is defined depending on a sectoral analysis done by Vigeo and depending on three 
considerations: CSR criteria of a sensitive nature for the firm, CSR criteria of a fundamental 
nature for the firm, and CSR criteria of a vital nature for the firm. 
 Vigeo provides two types of evaluation of CSR practices: scores and ratings. Scores are 
established on a scale from 0 to 100 (a firm’s absolute score), so that a score of 0 shows little 
evidence of commitment (poor to very poor guarantee of risk management), whereas a score of 
100 shows an advanced commitment (social responsibility objectives actively promoted). These 
scores are continuous variables. Ratings are attributed depending on how far scores deviate 
from the average in the sector. In each domain the firm may be ranked as the least performing, 
below average performer, average performer, active performer or leading performer in the 
sector. 
7
 
                                                      
7   Additional details on Vigeo’s methodology are available here: 
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 Measuring CSR 
 
 To measure CSR, we rely on scores and ratings provided by Vigeo. For CSR ratings, the 
firm’s relative ranking within the sector (ratings) is represented by a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 (resp. 0) if the firm is ranked above (resp. below) the sectoral average in the 
corresponding CSR domain. This represents a measure applicable to different firms across 
sectors and comparable across different CSR practices. These relative rankings can be 
considered as industry-adjusted ratings. In addition to scores on each CSR dimension, we also 
build an aggregate CSR score by computing an average of the different CSR scores in order to 
have a global measure of the impact of CSR on financial performance. Note however that such 
an aggregate score is usually considered as an imperfect measure of CSR given the multiple 
dimensions of CSR (see Chen and Delmas, 2011). 
 Regarding the different dimensions of CSR, we restrict our analysis to three CSR 
dimensions: environment, human resources and business behaviour towards customers and 
suppliers. This restriction is motivated by the fact that, as explained above, not all criteria in 
each of the six CSR dimensions are activated for each sector and this leads to many missing data 
when taking into account all six CSR dimensions. In particular, the human rights and community 
involvement criterion is not specified for all firms. Moreover, corporate governance ratings are 
very stable across time and sectors (this dimension of CSR is most likely determined between 
shareholders and boards of directors, and is traded-off by managers to a much lesser extent 
than the other components of CSR). We therefore choose not to rely on this criterion in our 
empirical analysis. The three CSR dimensions are composed of the following criteria: 
  
    • Human resources: integration of human resources issues into corporate strategy; 
promotion of labour relations and employee participation; career development and training; 
quality of working conditions (remuneration systems, health and safety conditions, working 
hours)  
    • Environment: integration of environmental issues into corporate strategy 
(environmental strategy and eco-design, pollution prevention and control - soil, accidents, 
development of green products and services, protection of biodiversity); incorporation of 
environmental considerations into the manufacturing and distribution of products (protection 
of water resources, minimising environmental impacts from energy use, management of 
atmospheric emissions, waste, local pollution and environmental impacts from transportation); 
management of environmental impacts from the use and disposal of products/services  
    • Business behaviour in the supply chain (towards customers and suppliers): 
customers (product safety, information to customers, responsible contractual agreements); 
suppliers and subcontractors (sustainable relationships with suppliers, integration of 
environmental factors in the supply chain, integration of social factors in the supply chain); 
business integrity (prevention of corruption and anti-competitive practices).  
 
 From a theoretical point of view, those three CSR dimensions allow the capture of how 
the firm manages its relationship with the two types of stakeholders highlighted in section 2: 
                                                                                                                                                                            
http://csr.bilsp.org/presentations/en/Presentation%20Martine%20Combemale.pdf  
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voluntary business stakeholders for the human resources and customers and suppliers 
dimensions; and involuntary non-business stakeholders for the environmental dimension. Our 
empirical analysis hence allows testing of whether the impact of CSR on financial performance 
relies on a positive relationship between complementary CSR practices (among voluntary 
stakeholders) and a negative relationship between substitutable CSR practices (between 
voluntary and involuntary stakeholders). 
 Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables describing firm characteristics, 
financial performance and CSR scores are reported in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. If CSR scores 
are highly persistent, this can reduce the power of any panel data estimator. As we can see in 
Table 3 reporting the summary statistics of CSR scores between 1993 and 2007, this is not the 
case. 
 
Table  1:  Variables definition 
 Variable    Definition  
 Firm variables:    
 Tobin’s Q   (Market value of common equity+preferred stock+total debt)/total assets  
 ROA    Return on assets = net profits/total assets  
 Lsales    Log of firm’s annual net sales  
 Ltotal assets    Log of firm’s annual total assets  
 Debt ratio    Long term debt divided by total assets  
 R&D ratio    Research and Development expenses/total sales  
 NoR&D    = 1 if firms have R&D expenses missing  
 DJSTOXX600 index    = 1 if firms are listed in the DJSTOXX600 index  
 Advertising ratio    Total intangible assets/total sales  
 CSR dimensions:    
 HR score    Human resources score (over 0-100)  
 ENV score    Environmental score (over 0-100)  
 BB score    Business behaviour towards customers and suppliers score (over 0-100)  
 HR dummy    = 1 if HR ranking equal or above average in the sector and 0 otherwise  
 ENV dummy    = 1 if ENV ranking equal or above average in the sector and 0 otherwise  
 BB dummy    = 1 if BB ranking equal or above average in the sector and 0 otherwise  
 CSR global    (sum of the 3 scores: HR, ENV and BB)/3  
 
 
Table  2:  Descriptive statistics 
 Variable    Mean    SD    Min    Max  
 Tobin’s Q    1.28    1.17    0.11    11.26  
 ROA    1.80    0.76    -3.90    2.99  
 Lsales    15.64    1.36    11.64   19.55  
 Ltotal assets    15.98    1.33    11.97   19.45  
 Debt ratio    0.20    0.14    0    1.13  
 R&D ratio    0.02    0.05    0    0.72  
 NoR&D    0.58    0.49    0    1  
 DJSTOXX600 index    0.86    0.35    0    1  
 Advertising ratio    0.33    0.46    0    5.30  
 HR dummy    0.66   0.47    0    1  
 ENV dummy    0.67    0.46    0    1  
 BB dummy    0.64    0.47    0    1  
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Table  3:  Summary statistics of CSR over 2002-2007 
   2002    2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2002-2007  
 HR score    53    49    39    35    33    29    42  
 ENV score    55    50    35    30    34    27    41  
 BB score    54    48    36    36    37    39    44  
 CSR global    54    49    37    33    35    31    42  
 
 
 
 Tables 4, 5 and 6 show that average scores exhibit differences across countries and 
sectors. We see from Table 4 that the best performances in terms of human resources (HR 
score) are observed in France, Norway, the Netherlands, and Germany. The best performances 
on environmental issues (ENV score) are observed in Norway, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. Finally, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland, and Norway report the highest 
scores on business behaviour towards customers and suppliers (BB score). For both the social 
and environmental domains, Greece and Ireland report the lowest scores. It is thus worth 
controlling for countries’ differences as CSR practices are likely to depend on the legal system. 
We also introduce year fixed effects.  
Furthermore from Tables 5 and 6, we observe clear differences in CSR across industries. 
Some dimensions of CSR may be more important for specific industries and not so much for 
others. Table 5 reports the average industry CSR scores. We can see that the best CSR scores are 
obtained in sectors which have a negative public image on environmental or social issues, i.e. 
controversial industries such as automobile, transport and energy. This is consistent with Cai et 
al. (2012) observing that CSR in controversial industries would positively affect firm value. The 
least-performing sectors on both environmental (ENV) and social (HR) issues are the media and 
hotel industries. From Table 6, we see that the percentage of firms with CSR scores above the 
sectoral average is decreasing over the period. This may reflect both an increasing competition 
between firms and a stricter international regulation imposing tighter constraints and/or 
stronger market contestability on those dimensions of CSR. The descriptive analysis highlights 
the importance of controlling for sectors when estimating the CSR-firm performance 
relationship. Thus in section 5.2, we explore if there are some specific industrial patterns. 
 
The estimation of unconditional correlations (e.g. Spearman rank correlation) between 
the three CSR scores (see Table 7) shows that business behaviour (BB), environmental (ENV) and 
human resources (HR) scores are positively correlated. But since correlations might be induced 
by unobserved factors, we cannot conclude the existence of complementarities from these 
types of results. 
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Table  4:  CSR average scores per country 
  HR score  ENV score  BB score    CSR global  
 Belgium    33    36    26    32  
 Denmark    33    35    35    34  
 Finland    42    37    38    39  
 France    43    35    40    39  
 Germany    42    40    40    41  
 Greece    19    15    21    18  
 Italy    33    30    34    32  
 Ireland    17    14    25    19  
 Netherlands    42    37   43    41  
 Norway    44    43    39    42  
 Portugal    37    37    33    36  
 Spain    35    35    31    34  
 Sweden    33    38    41    37  
 Switzerland    36    37    40    38  
 United Kingdom    37    41    42    40  
 
 
 
Table  5:  CSR average scores per sector 
    HR score    ENV score    BB score    CSR global  
 Agricultural and food    28    27    40    32  
 Auto    42    41    40    43  
 Construction    32    34    34    33  
 Consumption    28    25    37    30  
 Energy    43    43    40    42  
 Equipment    28    20    38    29  
 Finance    42    35    45    41  
 Hotel    23    19    35    26  
 Intermediary    39    39    40    39  
 ITC    31    24    37    31  
 Media    24    21    33    26  
 Telecom    42    38    40    40  
 Trade    28    29    40    32  
 Transport    35    40    40    38  
 
  
  
Table  6:  Firms with CSR ratings above the sectoral average (%) 
   
  2002    2003    2004    2005    2006   2007  
HR dummy    75    69    72    67    66    65  
ENV dummy    78    71    68    65    70    66  
BB dummy    82    66    65    64    67    63  
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Table  7:  Pairwise correlations between CSR scores   
  HR  ENV  BB  
 Human Resources (HR)   1    
 Environment (ENV)  0.46    1  
 Business Behaviour (BB)   0.45    0.44   1  
 
 
 
 4  Methodology 
 
 On the methodological side, we rely on an original two-step approach to test our three 
hypotheses proposed in section 2, that is to test how the complementarity and/or 
substitutability between the different CSR dimensions (human resources, environment, business 
behaviour) affects the relationship between CSR and financial performance (measured by ROA 
and Tobin’s Q). In the first step, we use CSR measured by scores and exploit the dynamic 
dimension of our dataset through the system GMM (Generalised Method of Moments) 
technique and estimate the impact of CSR scores on financial performance. In particular, this 
method allows us to take account of endogeneity and causality between CSR and financial 
performance. Moreover, we explore if there are some industry patterns, i.e. whether the impact 
of CSR on financial performance varies across different industries. Then in the second step we 
test explicitly the complementarity between the relative ratings on environmental, human 
resources and business behaviour using a technique developed by Kodde and Palm (1986). We 
are thus able to determine which dimensions are complementary and which are relative 
substitutes inputs of financial performance. 
 
 4.1  Empirical strategy 
 
 From a methodological point of view, we have to cope with three issues. First, by 
exploiting the dynamic structure of our data, we consider that past financial performance may 
explain current financial performance (see Surroca et al., 2010). Second, when we investigate 
the relationship between CSR and financial performance, current financial performance is likely 
to be correlated with both observable and unobservable factors (i.e. observable and 
unobservable heterogeneity) which also determine CSR decisions. In particular, firms relying on 
high quality processes and products tend to have higher CSR commitments. In turn, the 
contribution of CSR to financial performance will be overstated if we do not correct for 
endogeneity problems. Finally, causality may run in both directions, that is from CSR to financial 
performance and from financial performance to CSR. We therefore need to take into account 
such a causality. 
 We estimate the relationship between financial performance, labelled itΠ  (ROA or 
Tobin’s Q), by its lagged value, 1−Π it , the CSR variables (scores or rating dummies as defined 
before), itCSR  and a set of firm-level control variables (lsales, ltotal assets, debt ratio, R&D 
ratio, advertising ratio, industry and country dummies, yearly dummies), labelled itX , according 
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to the following equation: 
 
 itiitititi XCSRt εµδγβα ++++Π+Π −1=  (1) 
 
 where i  refers to firm, t  to time, iµ  are unobserved firm-specific fixed effects and itε  is 
the error term. 
 Two traditional potential sources of endogeneity may arise when we estimate Eq.(1): 
unobservable heterogeneity (which arises if there are unobservable factors that affect both the 
dependent and explanatory variables) and simultaneity (which arises if the independent 
variables are a function of the dependent variable or the expected values of the dependent 
variable). Moreover, one additional source of endogeneity that is often ignored arises from the 
possibility that current values of CSR are a function of past financial performance. Here, we 
argue that the cross-sectional variation in observed CSR is driven by both unobservable 
heterogeneity and the firm’s history. 
 One potential solution to the problem of simultaneity is to estimate the effect of CSR on 
financial performance using a system of equations taking into account all the CSR dimensions. 
However, estimating with this system requires us to identify strictly exogenous instruments. It 
has traditionally been difficult to identify and justify a strictly exogenous instrument. A fixed-
effects model can potentially ameliorate the bias arising from unobservable heterogeneity but 
such a model assumes that current observations of the explanatory variable are completely 
independent of past values of the dependent variable. Here, we consider that current levels of 
CSR scores are related to past financial performance, and so we follow Wintoki et al. (2012) and 
examine this assertion with a series of tests involving OLS regressions of current levels of CSR 
scores and other firm-specific variables 
8
 and changes in these levels on past performance and 
historical values of the firm-specific variables. 
 Table 8 reports the results of OLS regressions of current levels of CSR scores and 
changes in these levels on past performance (ROA & Tobin’ Q) and past values of the firm-
specific variables. OLS regressions of the levels of CSR scores on past financial performance 
show that CSR scores are significantly negatively related to past financial performance for ROA 
and positively related to Tobin’s Q (except for the environmental score regarding ROA). These 
results underline that the Tobin’s Q may more likely capture the value of long-term 
investments. The results from OLS regressions on changes in CSR scores are similar to those 
obtained on levels. Thus, we can conclude that CSR is dynamically endogenous (CSR is 
determined by past financial performance) and we need an econometric technique that 
accounts for such a dynamic endogeneity process when we estimate the impact of CSR on 
financial performance. 
  
  
                                                      
8  Results are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request. 
15 
 
 
Table  8:  Relationship between CSR scores and past financial performance 
   HR   ENV   BB   CSR global  
 Dependent variable is level at time t:  
ROA (t-1)   -0.106*   -0.027   -0.003**  -0.004**  
  (0.056)   (0.018)   (0.00)   (0.001)  
         
Dependent variable is level at time t:  
Tobin’s Q (t-1)   0.014   0.096**   0.077**   0.026**  
  (0.022)   (0.027)   (0.049)   (0.013)  
         
         
  ∆ HR   ∆ ENV   ∆ BB   ∆ CSR global  
Dependent variable is change from t-1 to t:  
ROA (t-1)   -0.003   -0.024**  -0.003**  -0.004**  
  (0.002)   (0.010)   (0.001)   (0.002)  
         
Dependent variable is change from t-1 to t:  
Tobin’s Q (t-1)   0.051**   0.109**   0.022**   0.026**  
  (0.022)   (0.054)   (0.011)   (0.012)  
         
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10  
 The other control firm variables included in the estimations but not reported here are:   
 Ltotal assets (t-1), Lsales (t-1), R&D ratio (t-1), debt ratio (t-1),  
Advertising ratio(t-1) and the scores for each CSR dimension.  
 
 
 4.2  The relationship between CSR and financial performance in a dynamic 
framework 
 
 We estimate the relationship between CSR scores and financial performance using the 
dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, called system GMM (see Blundell 
and Bond, 1998). 
 The system GMM estimator extends the GMM in differences (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
by estimating a system of both first-difference equations and level equations with a wider set of 
instruments. We need to rewrite the dynamic model of Eq.(4) in a first-differenced form: 
 
 ititititit XCSR εδγβα ∆+∆+∆+∆Π+∆Π −1=  (2) 
 
 This dynamic modelling approach has been used in empirical analyses where the 
structure of the problem suggests both a dynamic relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables and an endogeneity issue (see among others Hoechle et al.; 2012, 
Wintoki et al., 2012). Unlike traditional fixed-effects estimates, the dynamic panel system GMM 
estimator allows current CSR scores to be influenced by previous realisations of past financial 
performance. Ignoring both unobservable heterogeneity (as in the pooled OLS model) and the 
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dynamic CSR-financial performance relationship (as in the fixed-effects model) may create some 
biases. An important aspect of the system GMM methodology is that it relies on a set of internal 
instruments. In particular past values of CSR scores and financial performance can be used as 
internal instruments for current realisations of CSR. This method partially eliminates the need 
for external instruments. Here we include the lagged value of financial performance in the 
model, and we use historical financial performance and the other firm control variables (i.e. 
ltotal assets, lsales, R&D ratio, debt ratio and advertising ratio) lagged for two periods as 
instruments for the endogenous CSR variables. Thus, the system GMM estimator allows us to 
obtain consistent estimates by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, fixed effects, 
simultaneity and endogeneity. 
 Two conditions are required for estimators to be consistent (see Arellano and Bond, 
1991). The first one is a test of second-order serial correlation. In order to control for the 
dynamic aspects of our empirical relationship, any historical value of financial performance 
beyond the lags we have introduced in the estimation is a potentially valid instrument since it 
will be exogenous to current financial performance shocks. If this assumption is valid, by 
construction the residuals in first differences (AR(1)) should be correlated, but there should not 
be serial correlation in second differences (AR(2)). The second test is a Hansen test of over-
identification which yields a J-statistic distributed under the null hypothesis of the validity of our 
instruments. Since the system GMM estimator uses multiple lags as instruments, their validity 
must be guaranteed. 
 Note that the econometrics literature highlights some limitations of such a dynamic 
panel estimation methodology: relying on the firm’s history (lags of dependent and 
independent variables) for identification may induce a potential bias of weak instruments 
(Staiger and Stock, 1997, Stock and Yogo, 2005). Our paper contributes to this literature by 
discussing the conditions under which the system GMM estimator improves inference beyond 
traditional OLS and fixed-effects estimates in a dynamic framework. 
 
 
 
 5  Results 
 
 The first step of our empirical investigation consists of providing direct empirical 
evidence of the dynamic relationship between CSR scores and financial performance. We use 
ROA as a measure of financial performance (see Table 9) and replicate all these estimations 
using Tobin’s Q (see Table 10) to assess whether our results are sensitive to specific financial 
performance indicators. We compare the results using the system GMM estimator with the 
ones from static OLS and fixed-effects models in order to identify the biases that may arise from 
ignoring the dynamic dimension of such a relationship. Moreover, in order to test for a specific 
relationship between CSR and financial performance in controversial sectors, we estimate a 
traditional fixed-effects model. Finally, we directly test for pairwise complementarity and 
substitutability between the different CSR ratings. 
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 5.1  The CSR-Financial Performance Relationship 
 
 Table 9 displays static pooled OLS and fixed-effects estimates and then dynamic pooled 
OLS and system GMM estimates when financial performance is measured by the ROA, using 
both the CSR scores for each CSR dimension and the aggregate CSR score (for CSR global, only 
the system GMM estimations are reported here but our additional estimations are available 
upon request)
9
. Results when financial performance is measured by the Tobin’s Q are displayed 
in Table 10. For the system GMM estimator, we validate the two previously presented standard 
tests on misspecification: the second-order serial correlation test (the AR(2) test) and the 
Hansen test of other-identifying restrictions. 
 
The positive and significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable confirms that 
financial performance is persistent, I.e. financial performance depends substantially on its own 
past realisations. The results show that regardless of the estimation methodology, there are no 
significant differences for the firm control variables. We find that both sales (i.e. size) and  
DJSTOXX600 index listing have a positive impact on financial performance. We find a negative 
impact of R&D intensity and of the advertising ratio on ROA. The debt ratio indicates mixed 
results, which have been extensively explored in the literature, since these two measures 
represent different opportunities for a firm. When we compare the estimates for the ROA and 
the Tobin’s Q, we find a negative relationship between debt ratio and ROA and a positive 
relation with Tobin’s Q, but the latter coefficient is only significant at 10%. This may be 
interpreted by the fact that, on one hand, higher levels of debt are expected to have a negative 
impact on financial performance for instance due to increased interest expenses and thus 
increases in costs associated with financing the firm’s strategy (see e.g. Hall and Weiss, 1967). 
On the other hand, debt may also play a positive role in alleviating agency problems by helping 
to discourage over-investment of free cash flow by self-serving managers (see e.g. Jensen, 1986, 
Stulz, 1990, or Harvey et al., 2004). 
 
 The estimates for the CSR scores depend on the model used. We can see that ignoring 
both unobservable heterogeneity (pooled OLS model) and the dynamic CSR-financial 
performance relationship (fixed-effects model) may create some biases. For instance the OLS 
and fixed-effects estimates suggest a negative relationship between the human resources score 
(HR) and financial performance, whereas the system GMM estimation reveals a positive 
relationship. Thus, it is worth considering dynamics when estimating the CSR-financial 
performance relationship. Since the OLS estimates and fixed-effects model may provide biased 
results, we focus our comments on the system GMM results. 
  
                                                      
9  Estimations were carried out using the Stata module Xtabond2 developed by D. Roodman (2006). 
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 Table  9:  The effects of CSR scores on financial performance (ROA) 
Variables  Pooled OLS 
(Static) 
Fixed-effects 
(Static) 
Pooled OLS 
(Dynamic) 
System GMM 
(Dynamic) 
System GMM 
(Dynamic) 
ROA (t-1)    0.556*** 0.306*** 0.229*** 
   (0.026) (0.051) (0.091) 
HR score  -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.019*  
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010)  
ENV score  0.008* 0.007* 0.008* 0.030***  
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)  
BB score  0.003 0.005** 0.001 0.003  
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)  
ENV*HR scores  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
ENV*BB scores  0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001***  
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  
HR*BB scores  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  
CSR global      -0.233*** 
     (0.082) 
Ltotal assets  -0.326*** -0.316** -0.170*** -0.466*** -0.243*** 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.033) (0.128) (0.059) 
Lsales  0.253*** 0.296*** 0.136*** 0.468*** 0.205*** 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.029) (0.130) (0.051) 
R&D ratio  -0.045* -0.072* -0.357 -0.543 -0.239 
 (0.025) (0.038) (0.561) (0.441) (0.031) 
No&RD  0.149 0.319 0.203 0.107 0.148 
 (0.113) (0.235) (0.094) (0.169) (0.112) 
Debt ratio  -0.206*** -0.191*** -0.096*** -0.071** -0.059* 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.020) (0.036) (0.032) 
DJSTOXX600 index  0.258***  0.167*** 0.155** 0.245*** 
 (0.076)  (0.062) (0.082) (0.034) 
Advertising ratio  -0.031* -0.043** -0.017 -0.071** -0.038 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.034) (0.030) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors dummies  Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Countries dummies  Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
  0.221 0.206 0.486   
AR1        p = 0.000 p = 0.010 
AR2        p = 0.590 p = 0.345 
Hansen test        p = 0.781 p = 0.556 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10  
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Table  10:  The effects of CSR scores on financial performance (Tobin’s Q) 
Variables  Pooled OLS 
(Static) 
Fixed-effects  
(Static) 
Pooled OLS 
(Dynamic) 
System GMM 
(Dynamic) 
System GMM 
(Dynamic) 
Tobin’s Q (t-1)    0.575*** 0.474*** 0.477*** 
   (0.157) (0.049) (0.052) 
HR score  -0.007** -0.006** 0.002 0.013***  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
ENV score  0.002 0.007 0.004 0.002  
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)  
BB score  0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004  
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)  
ENV*HR scores  -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
 (0.0003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)  
ENV*BB scores  0.001 -0.001** 0.001 -0.001***  
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  
HR*BB scores  0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
CSR global      -0.103*** 
     (0.036) 
Ltotal assets  0.290*** -0.318*** -0.200*** -0.153*** -0.127** 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.056) (0.025) (0.059) 
Lsales  0.068*** 0.136*** 0.048** 0.044** 0.055 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.027) (0.019) (0.060) 
R&D ratio  1.016*** 1.013*** 1.047*** 1.283*** 1.289*** 
 (0.515) (0.317) (0.257) (0.503) (0.420) 
No&RD  -0.185 -0.099 -0.113 -0.187 0.099 
 (0.169) (0.083) (0.071) (0.167) (0.102) 
Debt ratio  -0.016 0.007 0.123* 0.127* 0.151 
 (0.012) (0.11) (0.071) (0.070) (0.113) 
DJSTOXX600 
index  
0.344***  0.211*** 0.196*** 0.148*** 
 (0.048)  (0.073) (0.045) (0.039) 
Advertising ratio  0.045*** 0.038*** 0.008 0.011 0.020 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.021) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Countries 
dummies  
Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
  0.305 0.231 0.781   
AR1     p = 0.008 p = 0.006 
AR2     p = 0.336 p = 0.301 
Hansen test     p = 0.667 p = 0.684 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10  
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 Regarding the sign of the relationship between CSR scores and financial performance, 
we see that a high performance on human resources (HR score) has a negative impact on the 
ROA, but a positive impact on the Tobin’s Q. Since the Tobin’s Q can be more appropriate to 
capture the value of long-term investments, it seems that investors evaluate positively such a 
social commitment. However, being environmentally friendly (ENV score) enhances only the 
ROA. Thus, financial performance measures matter since we find differentiated impacts on 
accounting (ROA) versus market-based (Tobin’s Q) measures of financial performance. The 
aggregate measure of CSR (CSR global) has a negative impact on financial performance for both 
the ROA and the Tobin’s Q. This result highlights that it is worth taking into account the 
different dimensions of CSR in order to understand the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance. Moreover, we also see that a high score simultaneously on human resources and 
environment has a negative impact on the Tobin’s Q (the interaction term ENV*HR is negative 
and significant), and the interaction between environmental and business behaviour (ENV*BB 
scores) has a negative impact on the ROA. However, we find a positive effect for the interaction 
term between human resources and business behaviour (HR*BB) scores. We find similar results 
for the Tobin’s Q. 
 These primary findings suggest some kind of trade-offs between the different CSR 
components. For instance, firms with responsible supply chain management should not invest 
simultaneously in environmentally friendly processes (it will lower financial performance) but 
they can have social commitment. In terms of promoting financial performance, there seem to 
be some conflicts among stakeholders (supply chain associates and the environment), and 
synergies among others (supply chain associates and employees). However, CSR commitment 
may differ across sectors. Thus, we need to test for industrial patterns and provide some 
insights into the CSR-financial performance relationship in controversial sectors, as well as test 
the robustness of these primary results. 
 
 
 5.2  The CSR-financial performance relationship in controversial industries 
 
 Are there any industrial patterns that may affect the link between CSR and financial 
performance? As reported previously, Table 5 indicates that some dimensions of CSR may be 
more important in specific industries and less in others. This section proposes some insights into 
this issue. Recent studies emphasise the importance of CSR in controversial sectors such as 
tobacco and alcohol, or industries involved with emerging environmental, social or ethical issues 
(i.e. weapons, nuclear, oil, cement or biotech). As pointed out by Cai et al. (2012), CSR 
commitment is positively associated with financial performance in controversial industries 
although their products might be detrimental to the environment, human beings and society. 
Managers of firms in controversial industries may in fact use CSR as a means to enhance their 
reputation (Goel and Thakor, 2008). Table 11 displays static fixed-effects estimates using both 
the ROA and the Tobin’s Q as financial performance indicator, by separating controversial 
industries from the others
10
. 
                                                      
10  We have only 330 firm-year observations for the controversial industries sample, thus, we cannot 
estimate a system GMM model. 
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 Table  11:  CSR and financial performance in controversial industries: Fixed effects models 
Variables  ROA  ROA  Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q  
 (Sin sectors)  (Other sectors)  (Sin sectors)  (Other sectors)  
HR score   -0.132**   0.049   -0.002   0.005  
  (0.066)   (0.079)   (0.006)   (0.004)  
ENV score   0.193**   -0.121*   0.012**   -0.008**  
  (0.096)   (0.063)   (0.005)   (0.003)  
BB score   -0.099   0.215***   -0.001   0.015***  
  (0.082)   (0.067)   (0.002)   (0.004) 
ENV*HR scores   -0.0014   0.003**   -0.001**   0.001**  
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
ENV*BB scores   -0.003*   -0.001   -0.001   -0.001  
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
HR*BB scores   0.004**   -0.003**   0.001   -0.001**  
  (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000)  
CSR global   -0.284**   -0.306***   -0.111**   -0.135**  
  (0.121)   (0.074)   (0.046)   (0.032)  
Year dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R
2
   0.429   0.344   0.441   0.459  
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10  
 The other control firm variables included in the estimations but not reported here are:   
 Ltotal assets, Lsales, R&D ratio, debt ratio and advertising ratio(t-1).  
 
 
 
 
 Here, given the nature of our data, we can only identify as potentially controversial 
industries (sin sectors) firms belonging to the energy, automobile, transport and agri-food 
sectors (see Table 5). We do find different industrial patterns when we compare the results for 
controversial industries with others. We find a negative and significant effect of the aggregate 
measure of CSR (CSR global) for both financial performance indicators in controversial industries 
and in the others. However, controversial industries are more likely to invest in the environment 
(ENV score) rather than human resources (HR score) compared to the other sectors. When 
financial performance is measured with the ROA in controversial industries, human resources 
(HR) and business behaviour (BB) scores appear as joint inputs of financial performance, 
whereas the environmental dimension does not interact positively with the two other CSR 
dimensions, suggesting conflicts between voluntary business and involuntary non business 
stakeholders. This may mean that firms in controversial industries are likely to adopt a specific 
investment strategy regarding the environment in order to enhance their reputation. For the 
other industries, human resources (HR) and environmental (ENV) scores are rather joint inputs 
of financial performance and firms invest significantly more in the business behaviour 
dimension (BB score), suggesting less conflicts among (business and non business) stakeholders. 
We find similar effects for the Tobin’s Q estimates. 
 Our results give some partial insights and confirm the recent studies that show the 
importance of CSR commitment in controversial industries. Thus, industrial patterns in CSR 
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commitment should be taken into account when we consider the CSR-financial performance 
relationship. For this purpose, a complementary analysis of the robustness to our previous 
estimations is to estimate simultaneously the impact of the different CSR dimensions by using 
the industry-adjusted ratings rather than the CSR scores and then to directly and explicitly test 
for complementarities between these different dimensions. 
 
 
 5.3  Testing for complementarity between the different CSR industry-
adjusted ratings 
 
 To explicitly test our three hypotheses (see section 2), we must control for the firm’s 
industry. Thus, we need to use the firm’s relative CSR rankings within the sector (and not the 
CSR scores, which do not take into account the firm’s industry or sector). For this purpose, we 
rely on a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (resp. 0) if the firm is ranked above (resp. 
below) the sectoral average on the corresponding CSR dimension. The interest of such relative 
rankings is multiple: they represent a measure allowing comparisons across sectors and across 
various CSR dimensions, they can thus be considered as CSR industry-adjusted ratings and 
contrary to CSR scores they cannot be affected by some potential multicollinearity (see Table 7). 
Given that we have three CSR dimensions (HR, ENV and BB), we need to identify clusters of 
ratings as follows. We define 8 dummy variables, labelled ’CSR states’, by following the 
convention of binary algebra: these variables are equal to 1 when the firm obtains a rating 
above sectoral average on one, two or three CSR dimensions, and zero otherwise. Definition 
and descriptive statistics for the eight CSR states are reported in Table 12. We can see that the 
most frequent state is the extreme one - best performance on all CSR dimensions (45%), 
whereas the other states are uniformly distributed. 
 Table  12:  CSR states 
 CSR states   State   %  
 Ranking below sectoral average on the three dimensions   State000   9  
 Ranking above sectoral average on Human Resources (HR)   State100   5  
 Ranking above sectoral average on Environment only (ENV)   State010   5  
 Ranking above sectoral average on Business Behaviour (BB)   State001   8  
 Ranking above sectoral average on HR and ENV    State110   12  
 Ranking above sectoral average on HR and BB   State101   8  
 Ranking above sectoral average on ENV and BB   State011   8  
 Ranking above sectoral average on the three dimensions   State111   45  
 
 
Table 13 displays the regression analysis for the system GMM estimator using CSR states 
dummies. As for previous estimations, the set of instruments is composed of the dependent 
variable, the CSR states (dummies) and the control variables, all lagged over two periods. The 
Arellano and Bond test on autocorrelation supports the overall validity of the model by 
providing evidence of first order autocorrelation (AR1) and the absence of second order 
autocorrelation (AR2) while the Hansen test supports the consistency of the GMM instruments. 
Thus, our estimation controls properly for potential correlation between unobserved factors 
and the regressors. 
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 Regarding the traditional determinants of financial performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) 
and its persistence, we obtain the same results as in Tables 10 and 11. Regarding the CSR states 
dummies, considering the reference state (State000: all CSR ratings below sectoral average) we 
observe some significant positive states on financial performance: being above sectoral average 
in human resources (HR) and business behaviour (BB) (State101) and in environment (ENV) and 
business behaviour (BB) (State011) increases ROA. These results may highlight that the business 
behaviour (BB) dimension can be considered as the component that can be more easily 
matched with the other two CSR components. Significant at 10%, we have the State111 (ratings 
above sectoral average on the 3 CSR dimensions) and State110 (ratings above sectoral average 
on human resources and environment). Sectoral leadership simultaneously on the three CSR 
dimensions (State111) is likely to enhance financial performance. For the Tobin’s Q only 
State100 (rating above sectoral average on human resources) is significantly positive. 
As pointed out by Mohnen and Roller (2005), the individual significance and signs of the 
state coefficients do not directly reveal whether CSR components are complementary or 
substitutable for two reasons. First, complementarity involves testing linear restrictions on 
several coefficients. Second, complementarity requires testing the joint distribution of several of 
these linear restrictions. For both reasons, it is possible that all coefficients are statistically 
insignificant, even though the joint hypothesis for complementarity is accepted. Several 
alternative empirical testing procedures have been derived to formally examine discrete 
complementarity among business practices (see Athey and Stern, 1998 for an overview). Here, 
we follow the ‘productivity approach’ which has been implemented especially in the innovation 
literature with a precise examination of multiple complementarities (see e.g. Leiponen, 2005; 
Mohnen and Roller, 2005; Belderbos et al., 2006 or Lucena, 2011). This approach relies on a 
direct test of supermodularity. 
 
The theory of supermodularity establishes that two or more dimensions are 
complements when using one more intensely increases the marginal benefit of using others 
more intensively, that is when ’the whole is more than the sum of its parts’ (see Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1995). When there are more than two dimensions, an important result from the theory 
of supermodularity states that a function is supermodular over a subset of its argument if and 
only if all pairwise components in the subset are complementary. In other words, when there 
are more than two dimensions it suffices to check for pairwise complementarities (see Topkis, 
1978; Mohnen and Roller, 2005). 
 In order to empirically identify discrete complementarities between CSR states, we 
follow Mohnen and Roller (2005) and we use the methods developed by Kodde and Palm 
(1986), applied for instance by Leiponen (2005). Given the definition of the CSR states in Table 
12, we write the inequality constraints for supermodularity as a set of restrictions on the 
estimates of the coefficients on the CSR states. We need to test jointly for the set of six 
inequality constraints on the CSR states coefficients. The tests for complementarity 
(supermodularity) and substitutability (submodularity) are joint one-sided Wald tests of the 
constraints. 
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Table  13:  CSR states and financial performance: System GMM 
Variables   ROA   Tobin’s Q  
ROA(t-1)   0.356**    
  (0.180)    
Tobin’s Q (t-1)     0.557***  
    (0.117)  
State000   Ref.   Ref.  
     
State111 (HR, ENV & BB) 
a
   0.645*   0.166  
  (0.351)   (0.173)  
State110 (HR & ENV) 
b
   0.676*   0.316  
  (0.410)   (0.203)  
State100 (HR)   0.471   0.419**  
  (0.421)   (0.205)  
State001 (BB)   0.571   0.192  
  (0.452)   (0.235)  
State010 (ENV)   0.476   0.266  
  (0.443)   (0.228)  
State011 (ENV & BB)   1.075***   0.333  
  (0.412)   (0.220)  
State101 (HR & BB)   0.743**   0.108  
  (0.389)   (0.218)  
Ltotal assets   -0.262***   -0.174***  
  (0.071)   (0.044)  
Lsales   0.186***   0.066***  
  (0.061)   (0.022)  
R&D ratio   -0.470   1.603***  
  (0.877)   (0.318)  
NoR&D dummy   -0.002   0.016  
  (0.078)   (0.027)  
Debt ratio   -0.145***   0.235**  
  (0.049)   (0.120)  
DJSTOXX600 index   0.151*   0.156***  
  (0.900)   (0.051)  
Advertising ratio   -0.023   -0.054  
  (0.020)   (0.044)  
Year dummies   Yes   Yes  
Sector dummies   Yes   Yes  
Countries dummies   Yes   Yes  
AR1   p = 0.001   p = 0.009  
AR2   p = 0.286   p = 0.297  
Hansen test   p = 0.799   p = 0.659  
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10  
a: Ratings are above sectoral average on the three CSR dimensions.  
b: Ratings are above sectoral average on human resources and environment.  
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 Considering the estimates of the coefficients on the CSR state variables ijkβ , the 
inequality constraints on the coefficients supporting supermodularity (that is complementarity) 
and the corresponding null ( 0H ) versus alternative ( aH ) hypotheses to be tested are written: 
 •  [HR & ENV] supermodular: 
 
 010100110001011101111 and βββββββ ≥−−≥−  (3) 
 
 Supermodularity test (complementarity): 
 0)(: 100100110 ≥+−+ iiiiH ββββ  against )(: 10010011 iiiiaH ββββ +−+  ≱0, i=0,1 
 •  [HR & BB] supermodular:  
 100001101010110011111 and βββββββ ≥−−≥−  (4) 
 
 Supermodularity test (complementarity): 
 0)(: 011000110 ≥+−+ iiiiH ββββ  against )(: 01100011 iiiiaH ββββ +−+  ≱0, i=0,1 
 •  [ENV & BB] supermodular:  
 010001011100110101111 and βββββββ ≥−−≥−  (5) 
 
 Supermodularity test (complementarity): 
 0)(: 100100110 ≥+−+ iiiiH ββββ  against )( 10010011 iiiiaH ββββ +−+  ≱0, i=0,1 
  
Note that we use 0=000β . Moreover, in the three cases, submodularity tests 
(substitutability) are written  H0: … ≤ 0 against Ha: …. ≰ 0 
  
Testing for pairwise complementarity under the null hypothesis, and considering that 
the test for supermodularity is a one-sided test of a given pair of inequality, we thus compute a 
distance measure and compare it with lower and upper bound critical values for the distance 
test or Wald test. Values of the Wald test below the lower bound critical value imply that the 
null hypothesis is accepted. Values above the upper bound critical value yield a rejection of the 
null hypothesis. Values in between the two bounds imply that the test is inconclusive. 
 Table 14 presents the results of the joint tests for these inequality restrictions. 
  
Table  14:  Tests for supermodularity (complementarity) and submodularity (substitutability) 
Hypothesis  Supermodularity test Submodularity test 
 ROA Tobin’s Q ROA Tobin’s Q 
Human resources and environment  0.191 0.377* 4.18e-09* 0.121* 
Human resources and business behaviour  0.025** 1.53e-012** 3.063 3.367 
Environment and business behaviour  1.695 0.653 0.206* 0.135* 
 Based on Kodde and Palm (1986).  
 The critical values provided by Kodde and Palm for α=0.25 are: 0.455 and 2.090.  
 The values marked * support the null hypothesis of supermodularity or submodularity.  
 The values marked ** support the null hypothesis of supermodularity and reject the null hypothesis of submodularity 
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 Table 14 should be interpreted as follows. If the test value is below 0.455, the null 
hypothesis of supermodularity (submodularity) is accepted, and if the test value is above 2.090, 
the null hypothesis is rejected (at 0.25=α , the same level as used by Leiponen, 2005). For test 
values between the two critical values, the test is inconclusive. When supermodularity can be 
accepted and submodularity rejected simultaneously, there is evidence for strict 
supermodularity. When supermodularity can be accepted but the submodularity test is 
inconclusive, the evidence for strict supermodularity is weaker. Finally, when both 
supermodularity and submodularity can be accepted simultaneously, strict supermodularity is 
rejected. 
 We therefore have the following results. First, note that the results in terms of 
complementarity and substitutability are identical whether they are based on the ROA or the 
Tobin’s Q. These results confirm that complementarity in fact matters in the relationship 
between CSR and financial performance. However contrary to previous results, robustness tests 
of complementarity do not appear sensitive to the measure of financial performance used. 
 Regarding the nature of interactions among each CSR dimension, the results of the test 
show that for human resources (HR) and environment (ENV) the test is inconclusive. For human 
resources (HR) and business behaviour (BB) the null hypothesis of supermodularity fails to be 
rejected and the null hypothesis of submodularity is rejected, supporting strict supermodularity 
(or complementarity). For environment (ENV) and business behaviour (BB), the supermodularity 
test is inconclusive and the null hypothesis of submodularity fails to be rejected, supporting 
weak submodularity (or substitutability). 
 Simply stated, we show that one pair of CSR practices is substitutable: environment 
(ENV) & business behaviour (BB); and one pair of CSR practices is complementary: human 
resources (HR) & business behaviour (BB). In other words, our hypothesis 1 (complementarity 
explained by the conflict-resolution hypothesis) is confirmed for the human resources and 
business behaviour pair, but it is not valid for the other pairs (human resources and 
environment; environment and business behaviour). Our hypothesis 2 (substitutability 
explained by the over-investment hypothesis) is confirmed for the environment and business 
behaviour pair, but it is not valid for the other pairs. And finally, our hypothesis 3 is confirmed: 
CSR practices are complementary inputs of financial performance when they positively affect 
voluntary business stakeholders (mutual benefit between practices towards employees and 
supply chain associates, since human resources and business behaviour are relative 
complements) and they are substitutable inputs of financial performance when they positively 
affect voluntary business and involuntary non-business stakeholders (conflicts between 
practices towards supply chain associates and the environment). Overall, the new stakeholder 
theory appears consistent with our data on CSR and financial performance in publicly traded 
European firms. This is summarised in Table 15. 
  
Table  15:  Summary of results 
 Hypothesis  HR & ENV HR & BB ENV & BB 
 H1: Complementarity (conflict-resolution)  No Yes No 
 H2: Substitutability (over-investment)  No No Yes 
 H3: New Stakeholder Theory  No Yes (mutual benefit) Yes (conflicts) 
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 6  Concluding remarks 
 
 No consensus has been reached so far on whether or not CSR leads to higher financial 
performance. We provide one potential explanation for this absence of conventional wisdom 
which hides a double phenomenon: high performance in firms implementing complementary 
CSR practices, and low performance in firms implementing substitutable CSR practices. This 
study provides an original contribution to the existing literature as we show that the nature of 
complementarity or substitutability between different CSR practices matters in the CSR-financial 
performance relationship. In particular human resources and business behaviour towards 
customers and suppliers are relative complements, whereas environment and business 
behaviour towards customers and suppliers are relative substitutes. 
 From a theoretical perspective, our results confirm that some domains of CSR yield 
mutual benefits and less conflicts among stakeholders (especially between employees and 
supply chain associates), while other domains yield more conflicts or over-investment among 
stakeholders (especially between supply chain associates and the environment). 
 For researchers interested in the CSR-financial performance relationship, our results 
imply that empirical models estimating the impact of any one CSR policy on financial 
performance will likely yield biased coefficients due to the omission of the other CSR variables. 
It is therefore important to take into account the various dimensions of firms’ CSR strategies 
and the interaction among those dimensions, but also to control for industry. Moreover, 
estimates of the impact of any global CSR measure may hide conflicting relations among sub-
domains, in the form of high performance when adopting complementary practices 
simultaneously and low performance when adopting substitutable practices simultaneously. 
 For managers of companies deciding to invest in CSR, two types of business models are 
valued by investors. In the first business model, synergies are exploited by developing CSR 
strategies focused jointly on human resources and the supply chain, which yield mutual benefits 
and reduce conflicts among those stakeholders. According to the second business model, it is 
better to develop CSR strategies focused on either the environment or the supply chain 
(business behaviour) rather than combining both dimensions simultaneously, due to conflict 
among those stakeholders or over-investment. Finally, while we find that it is worth taking into 
account the several dimensions of CSR, we do not investigate more deeply the subcriteria 
behind each broad domain. This analysis would prove a useful investigation of the CSR-financial 
performance missing link as is the case in Scholtens (2008) for instance. 
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